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THE COURT O1 APPEALS, 1954 TERM
in question. The mere fact that an item is not yet legally due and payable does not
mean that it may be ignored as a liability. 15
Judge Desmond, in a partial dissent, concurs as to the adjustment for taxes
but disagrees with the revised valuation of the inventory. His position is based upon
a strict interpretation of "book value" as the figures actually shown on the books. It
would seem, however, that basic fairness to the parties as well as sound accounting
procedure would require an adjustment to be made of the large discrepancy
existing between the physical and the estimated inventory.

Liability of Parent For Subsidiary's Debts
In an action by a trustee in bankruptcy of an insolvent subsidiary corporation
to compel the parent corporation to meet the obligations of its wholly-owned nonprofit subsidiary, judgment was given for defendant.'x
Defendant is a corporation organized to obtain low cost housing for its stockholders. In order to erect houses on the property it owned, defendant organized a
subsidiary corporation to do the contracting and construction work. The subsidiary
was to sell at cost the houses it erected to the defendant, who would sell the completed house and, lot to one of its stockholders. In 1949, two years after its creation, the subsidiary fell into a difficult financial position, and its creditors took over
the management of the business under an extension agreement. Almost four years
later the subsidiary was adjudicated a bankrupt. Subsequently the trustee in bankruptcy brought this action.
The exact situations which make a parent corporation liable for the debts of
its wholly owned subsidiary seem never to have been specifically designated. Professor Ballantine has said, "Unfortunately it does not seem possible to lay down
any definite test as to when the usual immunity of the stockholder should be disregarded."' 7 Certainly the court will disregard the separate entity if there has been
fraud or misrepresentation or an illegal purpose. x8 As to what constitutes fraud,
there is no simple definition. Intent to defraud creditors does not seem to be ah
essential element.19 If the subsidiary had insufficient capitalization to operate its
15. U. S. v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 422 (1926).
16. Bartle v. Home Owners Cooperative, 309 N. Y. 103, 127 N. E. 832 (1955).
17. Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations, 14
CAL L. REv. 12, 15 (1925).
18. Ibid. See also Douglas and Shanks, Insulation from Liability through
Subsidiary Corporations,39 YALE L. J. 193.
19. "It should not be necessary that an actual intent to freeze out creditors

appear in order to impose
TioNS, 140 (1936).

liability." LATry, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORA-
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business,20 or if it operated as the "puppet" of a parent which managed all of its
affairs,2 that will be enough to cause the court to pierce the corporate veil.
Similarly, if the parent receives any distribution of profits or assets in its position
as stockholder before the debts of the subsidiary are paid, this will make the
parent liable3P
The precise question of the instant case seems to be one of first impression in
New York. The subsidiary corporation was apparently given sufficient capital on
which to operate. Furthermore, the parent contributed, after the subsidiary's incorporation, additional funds at least equal to the original capital in an attempt to
bolster the failing subsidiary. The only indication of fraud, if any, is the bare fact
that the subsidiary was designed to operate on a non-profit basis.
The dissent, although it stated that the fact of non-profit operation constituted
a fraud, relied on authority based upon examples of insufficient capitalization. 3
The majority did not specifically state that the lack of profits did not constitute
fraud, but made the general statement that there was no fraud. The majority was
justified in its holding, since it tvould seem that the creditors should have no interest in the profits if the corporation was organized with sufficient capital to maintain the business under normal conditions. However, the decision does not seem
to set up a precedent of any significance, since the majority decision depends
upon the fact of fraud rather than the law of fraud.
20. Josepk R. Foard Co. v. State of Maryland, 219 Fed. 827 (2nd Cir. 1914);
Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace & Co., 267 Fed. 676 (4th Cir. 1920).
21. S. G. V. Co. of Del. v. S. G. V. Co of Pa., 264 Pa. 265, 107 Atl. 721 (1919).
22. Natelson v. A. B. L. Holding Co., 260 N. Y. 233, 183 N. E. 373 (1932).
23. The dissent cited no cases on the principle, but referred to LATY, op. cit.

supra note 4.The reference was to Latty's section on insufficient capitalization,
and the fact that some of the subsidiaries were designed to be non-profit was
secondary in those cases.

